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Transitional justice and its discontents: Socioeconomic justice in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the limits of international intervention 
 
Daniela Lai  
Royal Holloway, University of London  
 
The incorporation of socioeconomic concerns into transitional justice has traditionally, 
as a result of prevailing liberal notions about dealing with the past, been both 
conceptually and practically difficult. This paper demonstrates and accounts for these 
difficulties through the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country which has been 
characterised by a complex transition process and a far-reaching international 
intervention, encompassing transitional justice and peacebuilding as well as political 
and economic reforms. Examining the limits of international intervention in Bosnia and 
the marginalisation of socioeconomic justice issues, the paper analyses the events 
surrounding the protests that broke out in February 2014, and the ensuing 
international engagement with the protest movement. Faced with a broad-based civic 
movement calling for socioeconomic justice, the international community struggled to 
understand its claims as justice issues, framing them instead as problems to be tackled 
through reforms aimed at completing Bosnia’s transition towards a market economy. 
The operation of peacebuilding and transitional justice within the limits of neoliberal 
transformation is thus instrumental in explaining how and why socioeconomic justice 
issues become marginalised, as well as accounting for the expression of popular 
discontent where justice becomes an object of contestation and external intervention. 
 
 
 
Introduction  
This paper’s research question, like others in this issue, derives from the observation 
that transitional justice  and peacebuilding scholars have identified similar flaws in the 
types of intervention they discuss – in this case a lack of attention to socioeconomic 
justice – but that these insights have not been systematically brought together across 
both fields. Realising that legalistic approaches were not sufficient to deal with the 
whole universe of consequence of war and violence, authors have taken a greater 
interest in the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice over the past decade. 
The publication of Arbour’s remarks (2007), a high-profile expert and former 
prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, marked a critical shift by sparking debate on how social and economic justice 
for societies in transitions could be effectively conceptualised and achieved. Critical 
peacebuilding scholars have similarly expressed concerns for the flawed assumptions 
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of reconstruction programmes, and for their potential social effects (Pugh 2002, 2005; 
Donais 2005). Yet both literatures, with some important exceptions (e.g. Mani 2002; 
Sriram 2007; Lambourne 2009, 2014), tend to remain isolated from each other 
(Obradović-Wochnik and Baker, this issue; Millar and Lecy, this issue). This paper 
tackles the under-researched question of socioeconomic justice and its relationship to 
transitional justice and peacebuilding by looking specifically at the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH).   
Following the Bosnian war (1992-95), the international community became 
heavily engaged in processes of statebuilding, peacebuilding and transitional justice, 
which were meant to address the wide-ranging consequences of the conflict. 
Transitional justice strategies, specifically, relied on the establishment of individual 
accountability for war crimes through the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and local courts. The rationale of such instruments and their 
goals responded to a specific conception of justice broadly deriving from the liberal 
ideals that guided international interventions in the 1990s (Sriram 2007; Leebaw 2008; 
Nagy 2008). Socioeconomic justice issues – ranging from reparations to the systemic 
marginalisation of communities – were largely overlooked, and economic reforms did 
little to alleviate social injustice: instead, the reforms undertaken in Bosnia as part of 
the Dayton ‘post-socialist economic transformation’ bear ‘a strong family resemblance 
to other forms of neoliberal restructuring’ (Kurtović 2015, 641) that ultimately 
contributed to the subordination of social grievances to market logics. Connecting the 
critical literatures on peacebuilding and transitional justice, this paper demonstrates, is 
necessary in order to show how complex international interventions can marginalise 
experiences of socioeconomic injustice and thus be a conducive factor to the expression 
of popular discontent. The 2014 Bosnian protests and their immediate aftermath, 
analysed in this paper, were one such instance where justice claims, left unaddressed 
in the post-war period, led citizens to express dissatisfaction by taking to the streets.  
The protests of 2014, originating from the mobilisation of dissatisfied workers in the 
city of Tuzla, grew quickly in size and geographical scope, leading to further 
gatherings in Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar and other Bosnian cities. They were also 
characterised by the use of open ‘plenum’ meetings as a form of assembly and 
decision-making, and by horizontal participation and rejection of ethnic 
characterisations (Arsenijević 2014a; Mujkić 2015). All but unanticipated by the 
international community, which largely viewed ethnopolitical unrest as the greatest 
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destabilising factor in BiH, the ‘plenum protests’ presented a key test for international 
agencies in dealing with social grievances that had been muted until then. The tensions 
arising from the protests’ intersection with different facets of the international 
intervention in BiH, encompassing both peacebuilding and transitional justice, 
constitute the focus of this paper. 
As discussed further below, the field of transitional justice has historically 
struggled to include socioeconomic concerns in both conceptual and practical terms. In 
the Bosnian case, this paper argues, the marginalisation of socioeconomic justice issues 
is a result of the links between international intervention and post-socialist neoliberal 
economic reforms: not only did international intervention fail to address 
socioeconomic injustice directly (as some transitional justice literature already 
recognises), but it also supported reform programmes that further aggravated social 
conditions. Indeed, even when faced with protests driven by socioeconomic injustice as 
in 2014, the international community struggled to understand social claims within the 
parameters of transitional justice and peacebuilding set for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
To perceive this, however, it is necessary to look beyond the institutional aspects of the 
transformation promoted by intervention. It is in social struggles such as the 2014 BiH 
protests, and outside formal political institutions, that these links between transitional 
justice, peacebuilding and neoliberal economic reform become particularly visible, and 
where conceptions of justice have been most contested. The nexus between transitional 
justice and peacebuilding is therefore revealed as a space of contestation and social 
mobilisation, where injustices marginalised by the international intervention are more 
likely to be voiced.  
Debates surrounding the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice, as the 
paper begins by showing, have evolved from an earlier concern with economic 
remedies towards analysing forms of socioeconomic violence and their social impact. 
The history of these debates highlights the need for transitional justice scholars to 
engage more closely with forms of injustice that have been marginalised by liberal 
approaches towards dealing with the past. International engagement in the former 
Yugoslavia thus provides empirical grounding for tracing the close connections 
between transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts and the limiting effects that they 
have had on the emergence of justice claims of a socioeconomic nature. These 
connections, and the limitations they have produced, suggest that transitional justice 
scholarship could benefit much from further engagement with the critical 
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peacebuilding literature, and particularly its focus on practices of government, 
exclusion, and the power relations embedded in international interventions. The 
marginalisation of socioeconomic justice in BiH is also explained with reference to the 
grievances of specific groups and geographical areas, such as former industrial towns, 
that were at the heart of the February 2014 protests. These mostly stem from failed or 
irregular privatisations that led to layoffs and to the violation of workers’ rights, and 
from the overall impact of deindustrialisation on the economy. The last section of the 
paper focuses on the protests themselves, specifically on their socioeconomic nature, as 
well as the international reaction to the emergence of claims explicitly referring to 
socioeconomic justice.  
Socioeconomic justice claims, this paper argues, could not be understood within 
the parameters of transitional justice and peacebuilding as defined by the international 
community in the Bosnian setting. The international community responded, as a result, 
by reframing these as socioeconomic problems to be solved through the 
implementation of reforms that would complete Bosnia’s transition towards a market 
economy (Majstorović et al. 2015). While trying to approach protesters and common 
citizens by offering support and organising open meetings, the analysis of this case 
also shows that the international community favoured a model of ‘civil society’ that 
responds to the liberal peace paradigm, based on participation through registered 
organisations and structured discussion around set agendas. The protests, on the 
contrary, seemed more in line with new forms of political engagement that have 
emerged in Europe in recent years (Kaldor and Selchow 2015), characterised by 
horizontal and direct forms of political participation. From this point of view, one 
might wonder whether grassroots activism in BiH might bear more resemblance with 
movements calling for social justice in the post-2008 crisis elsewhere in Europe than 
with counterpart activities in Bosnian NGOs.  
 
 
 
Transitional justice and socioeconomic justice: towards a critical approach  
One of the challenges of analysing socioeconomic concerns in peacebuilding contexts 
lies in their contested conceptualisation, especially when we look at them from a justice 
perspective. Transitional justice, in one famous definition, amounts to ‘the conception 
of justice in periods of political transition’ (Teitel 2003, 3), but is commonly defined to 
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include judicial mechanisms as well as reparation programmes, truth commissions, 
and institutional reforms (ICTJ 2009). Transitional justice programmes have thus 
historically included an economic dimension, often represented by reparations. In 
more recent times, scholars have started recognising that transitional justice tools, 
including economic ones, have been overwhelmingly conceptualised and applied in 
relation to violations of fundamental civil and political rights, or serious violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), while leaving aside socioeconomic violence 
and crimes (see especially Arbour 2007). Definitions of the socioeconomic dimension of 
transitional justice can be seen as progressing along a continuum, moving from early 
concerns with economic remedies towards an increasing focus on the socioeconomic 
nature of the type of violence or violation committed.   
A first group of authors, therefore, defines socioeconomic justice in terms of the 
remedy proposed for the crime, that is, economic or material compensation for a 
certain crime or injustice that was not necessarily economic. This is the traditional 
understanding underpinning the practice of reparations, defined as ‘compensation, 
usually of a material kind and often specifically monetary, for some past wrong’ 
(Torpey 2003, 3), commonly with the aim of recognising the harm suffered, and 
promoting civic trust and solidarity (de Greiff 2006). While reparations could be 
traditionally seen as fundamentally ‘backward-looking’ (Posner and Vermeule 2003), 
they can also be considered ‘forward-looking’, as ‘a means of transforming the current 
conditions of deprivation suffered by the groups in question’ and ‘more frequently 
connected to projects of social transformation than commemorative projects’ (Torpey 
2003, 337). Reparations are also considered a key part of peacebuilding processes 
(Firchow and Mac Ginty 2013), especially those including a transitional justice 
component. The increased emphasis placed on their transformative or ‘emancipatory’ 
potential (Brett and Malagon 2013) should not, moreover, conceal their equally 
important symbolic meaning (Brown 2013). These recent studies are representative of a 
renewed concern for transformative approaches to justice, such as that advocated by 
Lambourne (2009, 2014). Her ‘transformative justice model’, situated within the 
peacebuilding paradigm, blends elements of retributive and restorative justice 
(Lambourne 2014, 21-22). In her definition, socioeconomic justice ‘incorporates the 
various elements of justice that relate to financial or other material compensation, 
restitution or reparation for past violations or crimes (historical justice) and distributive 
or socioeconomic justice in the future (prospective justice)’ (Lambourne 2014, 28-29).  
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At the other end of the spectrum, scholars have defined in greater detail the 
socioeconomic nature of violations and crimes committed, and discussed their 
potential inclusion within transitional justice processes. The need to define the 
socioeconomic aspect of injustice originates from the relevance of the ‘still largely 
undefined economic and social dimensions of conflict and repression’ (Hecht and 
Michalowski 2012, 1). Authors in this tradition commonly complain that violations of 
socioeconomic rights have taken second place in post-conflict justice efforts, despite 
their relevance for the populations affected. Even within this group, views diverge 
substantially between those who argue for focusing on established socioeconomic 
rights (Arbour 2007, Szoke-Burke 2015) or ‘subsistence harms’ (Sankey 2014) whose 
cases could be adjudicated in court,1 and those who propose a systemic approach to 
socioeconomic violence and injustice (Mullen 2015; Evans 2016). As Sharp (2014, 5) 
points out, economic violence includes, but goes beyond, violations of social and 
economic rights.  Still within this group, Laplante develops a continuum highlighting 
the different justice aims of reparations, ranging from the compensation for the 
violation of a right to the remedying of ‘historical social and economic inequalities’ 
(Laplante 2014, 66-70). Miller also suggests that economic issues are often downplayed 
as root causes of conflicts despite their relevance, and stresses how the transition 
process itself – often characterised by economic liberalisation - might exacerbate 
socioeconomic problems in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies (Miller 2008, 
267-268). Indeed, as this paper shows, economic liberalisation and the accompanying 
mismanagement of privatisation processes represent important sources of frustration 
at the root of the Bosnian protests.  
Regardless of their positioning, authors share a concern for the limited space 
granted to economic problems and remedies in most transitional justice settings. 
Equally important to definitional issues are thus discussions regarding the 
consequences of marginalising socioeconomic violence. Neglecting socioeconomic 
injustice could, for instance, impair post-conflict security and access to justice (Chinkin 
2009), and go against victims’ expectations and demands (Waldorf 2012, 175). At the 
same time, there is still uncertainty as to what mechanisms would be more appropriate 
for dealing with it, with some authors pointing at the potential role of truth 
commissions (Arbour 2007; Sankey 2014), or arguing for giving victims the political 
                                                          
1 ‘Subsistence harms’ are defined as ‘deprivations of the physical, mental and social needs of 
human subsistence’ (Sankey 2014, 122). 
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agency necessary to achieve distributive justice (García-Godos 2013). A deeper 
understanding of the consequences of such marginalisation on the peacebuilding 
process is definitely needed.  
While concerns have been raised over whether transitional justice or 
peacebuilding efforts could (and should) address socioeconomic wrongs (Waldorf 
2012; McAuliffe 2014), the expansion of our understanding of violence and – 
consequently – peace was already advocated by Galtung (1969). The work of Rama 
Mani (2002) also calls for a more holistic approach to dealing with the past, based on 
the concept of reparation. From such an inclusive perspective, justice should reach 
throughout society, including ‘neglected economic categories’ and ‘structural 
categories’, and attempt to re-establish the conditions previous to the conflict (Mani 
2008, 522-523). It is also fruitful to engage with scholars who have theorised 
socioeconomic justice as one dimension of a broader conception of justice that includes, 
in Nancy Fraser’s terms (applied to BiH by Maria O’Reilly elsewhere in this issue) 
instances both of recognition and redistribution (Fraser 1995).  Socioeconomic injustice 
is seen here as ‘rooted in the political-economic structure of society’, and encompassing 
exploitation, economic marginalization and deprivation (Fraser 1995, 70-71). From this 
perspective, doing justice could entail ‘political-economic restructuring of some sort. 
This might involve redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labour, 
subjecting investment to democratic decision-making, or transforming other basic 
economic structures’ (Fraser 1995, 73). This form of restructuring geared towards social 
justice as redistribution is, however, at odds with neoliberal restructuring carried out 
as part of Bosnia’s post-socialist transition, and promoted by the international 
intervention. 
Despite the recognition, by scholars and – increasingly – practitioners (OHCHR 
2014), of the need for addressing socioeconomic concerns within transitional justice 
approaches, international programmes have struggled to conceptually and practically 
include them in their programmes. The emergence of the 2014 protests, analysed here, 
shows that demands for socioeconomic justice were indeed partly brought about or 
aggravated by post-socialist reforms championed by the same international 
community engaged in peacebuilding and transitional justice programmes, whose 
operation might thus be inherently limited. Addressing the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shows how more limited interpretations of justice and peace, informed by 
a liberal approach, prevailed during the 1990s, linking together different aspects of the 
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international intervention, encompassing transitional justice and peacebuilding. The 
following section turns to analysing how post-war settings addressed by far-reaching 
international interventions present serious challenges to addressing socioeconomic 
concerns. 
 
 
International intervention and the marginalisation of socioeconomic justice  
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a clear illustration of how socioeconomic 
issues can be marginalised by transitional justice processes. Incorporating 
socioeconomic justice concerns presents specific challenges in contexts characterised by  
multiple and overlapping transition processes (Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
2013), including the transition from war to peace and from socialism to market 
economy and liberal democracy, and a far-reaching international intervention 
encompassing all dimensions of these transition processes. Justice issues, therefore, 
cannot be seen in isolation from other aspects of such intervention. In the aftermath of 
a war that took the lives of 100,000 people and that was characterised by genocide and 
widespread violence against civilians, justice issues rose to prominence early on in the 
international agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The establishment of the ICTY is 
representative of the increased relevance assigned to legal mechanisms of transitional 
justice. Scholarly interest has reflected this focus on war crimes prosecutions, looking 
at the establishment of the ICTY and its workings (Fatić 2000; Kerr 2004), national 
authorities' compliance with the ICTY (Kerr 2005; Subotić 2009; Lamont 2010; Rajković 
2012), societal opinions of the ICTY and its effects on society (Biro et al 2004; Meernik 
2005; Saxon 2005; Nettelfield 2010; Orentlicher 2010; Ivković and Hagan 2011).  
While this work absorbed much of the energies and time of transitional justice 
scholars, some turned their attention towards other aspects of the process of dealing 
with the past. For instance, noting that reforms in the education system are thought to 
have a positive impact on reconciliation, Jones (2012) studied the case of the Brčko 
district. Informed by Mouffe’s concepts of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, her work 
encourages us to look beyond the ‘success’ of educational reform in Brčko, which was 
designed to promote multi-ethnic integration, in order to analyse the way this was 
experienced and the local practices associated with it. Reconciliation processes, 
according to Jones, can be equated to the way in which ‘politics’ attempts to create an 
order out of conflictual human relationships (Jones 2012, 133). Other authors have also 
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asked questions regarding the role of other aspects of transitional justice – beyond 
trials – in ‘reconciliation’ processes. Clark’s work, for instance, tries to establish a link 
between different components of the transitional justice paradigm in the case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, ranging from prosecutions (Clark 2009), to missing persons (2010a), 
religious actors (2010b) and truth telling (2013). This literature contributes greatly to a 
multi-faceted understanding of dealing with the past, and shifts the focus towards 
those social aspects of this process that are also crucial in order to comprehend the 
relevance of socioeconomic justice.  
Given the legalistic focus of transitional justice in BiH, much less attention has 
been dedicated to the economic side of such processes. This marginalisation of 
socioeconomic justice should be understood in relation to the international 
intervention as a whole, and its treatment of the socioeconomic problems 
characterising Bosnia’s transition. The wars of the 1990s required transitional justice to 
operate within peacebuilding frameworks, as the latter were supposed to extend 
beyond military and humanitarian tasks, thus including the ‘promotion of national 
reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government’ (UN 1995). 
Simultaneously, and in line with post-socialist transitions occurring in Eastern Europe, 
where change was promoted through a ‘shock therapy’ approach (Sachs 1990), 
economic reforms inspired by the principles of the Washington consensus were also 
undertaken in Bosnia (Donais 2005, 26). Peacebuilding measures became intertwined 
with neoliberal reform, promoting ‘transformation through macroeconomic stability, 
reduction of the role of the state, the squeezing of collective and public space, a quest 
for private affluence, and a reliance on privatisation and on exports and foreign 
investment to stimulate economic growth’ (Pugh 2005, 25). While institutionally 
separated, these processes are closely interrelated dimensions of Bosnia’s transition: 
not only are transitional justice and peacebuilding tightly interwoven, but they are part 
of a broader international intervention that includes socioeconomic reforms. Most 
importantly, the 2014 Bosnian protests show how different facets of the international 
intervention intersect in experiences of socioeconomic injustice felt on the ground.  
While supposedly inspired by liberal ideals, international interventions in the 
1990s were also characterised by problematic implementations and by the realisation 
that liberal peace would not simply occur as a result of international goodwill or a 
specific institutional setup. In light of this realisation, critiques of international 
interventions and their modes of operation have emerged, though they have 
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progressed at a faster pace in the field of peacebuilding compared to transitional 
justice, at least within the former Yugoslav context. Within and beyond such context, 
the ‘peace v. justice’ debate emerged in the 1990s (see the introduction to this volume), 
where the very role of justice in peacemaking and peacebuilding was questioned, took 
precedence over scholarly reflections on alternative and contested notions of peace and 
justice. While Paris already in 1997 stressed the top-down nature of peacebuilding and 
its conformance to a ‘liberal internationalist’ paradigm, calling for the establishment of 
liberal democracy and market economy as basic elements of the liberal peace (Paris 
1997, 55-56),2 it took transitional justice scholars several years to recognise that the 
operation of international tribunals and similar mechanisms could be subject to the 
same critique (Sriram 2007). Transitional justice thus began to develop a critical 
tradition highlighting that, for instance, the deployment of specific mechanisms such as 
trials or truth commissions promoted specific conceptions of justice and violence while 
silencing others (Nagy 2008; Bhambra and Shilliam 2008). The transitional justice 
literature could benefit from a closer engagement with critical peacebuilding 
scholarship, especially at a time when discussions on the disciplining nature of 
international interventions and their ‘non-linearity’ are very much underway (Gabay 
and Death 2012; Chandler 2010, 2013). Compared to traditional approaches to the 
study of transitions, focused on institutional change (Linz and Stepan 1996; Stark and 
Bruszt 1998), the study of socioeconomic justice as a marginalised problem in complex 
transitional settings can benefit much from an approach geared towards understanding 
societal processes and local agency, and the impact of governing practices on these 
(Joseph 2009; Lazzarato 2009; Mac Ginty 2012).   
 
 
Neglecting socioeconomic justice, setting the stage for the protests?  
A closer look at socioeconomic justice issues in BiH further reveals the limitations of 
the transitional justice and peacebuilding approach adopted in this context. It also 
shows how important instances of socioeconomic injustice, such as those suffered by 
post-industrial towns, were substantially neglected, leading to the eruption of 
discontent witnessed in February 2014.  Socioeconomic issues were only addressed in 
                                                          
2 The critical peacebuilding scholarship subsequently contributed with much work on the 
concept of liberal peace, its assumptions and its implications. See for instance Richmond 2006 
and Chandler 2010. 
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very limited ways by transitional justice and peacebuilding programmes in BiH. Much 
of the international engagement on these matters was limited to the question of return 
and reconstruction as a way of ‘redressing the wrong’ of ethnic cleansing. Indeed, 
scholarly studies on the interethnic dimension of the war vastly outnumber those 
addressing economic crimes or even the economic implications of ethnic cleansing, a 
form of agenda-setting which – as the peacebuilding scholar Séverine Autesserre (2014) 
has argued – itself inevitably influences what becomes known and understandable to 
policy makers. Early analyses of return programmes in Bosnia, for instance, have 
criticised international policymakers for ‘hav[ing] shared with nationalists the view 
that Bosnians should be encouraged to live in particular places’ (Black 2001, 196). Jansen 
found that return, in the ‘hopes’ of most Bosnians, included not only secure housing 
but also stable employment and welfare provisions on which international intervention 
had not concentrated (Jansen 2006, 191). Compared to international policymakers, then, 
Bosnians possessed a broader conception of return that included recovering other 
social and economic features of their life during socialism. Without provisions for 
reintegrating returnees into social and economic life, such as the possibility to go back 
to their old workplaces, return programmes were inevitably weakened.  
In order to alleviate conditions of economic distress and help local 
development, some international organisations and donors did start offering economic 
means of support to returnees, including grants and microcredit loans, under the 
assumption that ‘economic opportunities and market activity’ have a positive impact 
on social reintegration (Haider 2009, 103-4). However, the impact of similar projects is 
contested (see for instance Pupavac 2006 on women). Reparations, another potential 
mechanism for alleviating post-conflict socioeconomic injustice, are managed at the 
entity level in BiH, in a dysfunctional way that systematically disempowers civilian 
victims (see Hronesova in this issue). Proposals advanced for other transitional 
countries, such as setting up truth commissions tasked with investigating and 
redressing economic violence or economic crimes, were never discussed in BiH. 
Instead, the timing of the privatisation process required by international donors, which 
privileged selling companies before restructuring them, contributed to privatisation 
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along ethnic lines (Stojanov 2001), and empowered wartime elites that would oppose 
investigating economic crimes.3  
Problems of socioeconomic justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina are, indeed, 
broader than what is encompassed within transitional justice or peacebuilding 
programmes, and should be understood as structurally connected both to the war and 
to its aftermath. While Yugoslavia had already received IMF loans conditional upon 
market-oriented reforms during the 1980s (Donais 2005), the socioeconomic 
characteristics of entire regions in Bosnia were radically transformed as a result of the 
1992-95 war and of war crimes. Firstly, the landscape of post-war Bosnia was not only 
shaped by huge population displacement but also by the physical destruction of 
buildings and infrastructure. According to a 2004 World Bank report, the war damaged 
about two thirds of houses in BiH, and destroyed one fifth of them; destroyed at least 
30% of the hospitals and about 45% of industrial facilities; and caused industrial 
production to fall to 5% of the pre-war levels (World Bank 2004, 1). Secondly, public 
buildings and production sites, such as the schools and mines in the Prijedor area, were 
used as prison camps during the war (Askin 2003). Thirdly, the conduct of business 
activities during the war, which offered the possibility of acquiring wealth quickly 
through illegal means such as smuggling, ‘contributed to the criminalization of the 
state and economy in the postwar period’ (Andreas 2004, 44). The new elites, who 
acquired economic means and political power during the war, were subsequently best 
placed to further increase both once the conflict was over, for instance by taking 
advantage of the privatisation process (Pugh 2002; Andreas 2004). Fourthly, and 
significantly for everyday understandings of ‘justice’ after the conflict, 
deindustrialisation and the layoffs accompanying privatisations hit particularly hard in 
those regions of Bosnia that had functioned as the ‘industrial core’ of Yugoslavia. The 
good living conditions enjoyed by industrial towns during socialism had sustained 
communities’ respect and admiration for certain features of the Yugoslav system, 
which ceased to exist as a result of the war and transition. From the point of view of the 
international intervention, however, socialist values and perspectives came to be 
perceived as ‘mis-placed, or dis-placed’ in post-war BiH, and did not form part of the 
                                                          
3 Stojanov explains that the privatisation of state companies was conducted at the entity level in 
BiH. Oligarchs of the dominant ethnic groups in the area, who had accumulated wealth and 
political power during the war, were thus in control of the privatisation process (Stojanov 2001). 
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‘broader public discourse shaping social transformation in the country’s postwar 
environment’ (Gilbert 2008, 168).  
Material losses, including loss of jobs and income, were deeply felt by the local 
population, and constituted the most common form of victimisation (Valiñas et al. 
2009, 19). Faced with such economic difficulties at the end of the war, the Bosnian 
population could not count on the same extensive welfare system of past Yugoslav 
times (Donais 2005, 143). Additionally, deindustrialisation meant reduced access to 
benefits previously enjoyed by factory workers, while social transfers benefitted 
categories such as war veterans over poorer strata of the population (Bartlett 2013, 251-
254). The economic system of the post-war and post-socialist period was characterised 
by a tight connection between political elites and questionable business enterprises, 
corruption and a recourse to ‘informality’ and the grey economy on the part of many 
citizens (Donais 2003; Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2013). The unequal access to economic 
opportunities stemming from informality, as Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2013) argues, acts 
against the peacebuilding goal of social reintegration and reinforces feelings of social 
injustice among the general population. If seen through this lens, socioeconomic justice 
issues in the Bosnian context can be related to the systemic marginalisation and 
impoverishment of communities, thus marking a stark contrast with the standard of 
life enjoyed during socialism. Yet, since they were closely interrelated with a post-
socialist transition inspired by neoliberal ideals, the prevailing understandings of 
peacebuilding and transitional justice within the international intervention could not 
draw on the socialist past as a point of reference for how society ought to be 
reconstructed (Gilbert 2006). The social justice elements of socialism that people valued 
most – such as job security, equality, and a strong welfare system – were therefore not 
compatible with the transformation envisaged for the Bosnian society. It is exactly in 
these feelings of social injustice, and in the popular discontent with the lack of 
engagement with these issues, that we find the source of the 2014 protests.  
 
 
When ‘civil society’ protests: Bosnian activism and international intervention 
Given the economic problems experienced in the aftermath of the war, and the lack of 
international engagement with these, it is not surprising that social discontent would 
be expressed, on the part of the Bosnian society, as it did on the occasion of the 
February 2014 protests. A more detailed analysis of these events shows that 
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marginalised socioeconomic justice concerns were at the heart of the protests; that the 
mobilisation involved common citizens and activists that were not part of the ‘civil 
society’ as defined and shaped by the international community; and that international 
organisations proved unable to debate socioeconomic justice issues on the same 
discursive level as citizens and activists’ demanded.  The protests started in Tuzla, a 
town that developed a relatively strong industrial sector during socialist time, but has 
been facing deindustralisation, failed privatisations and rising unemployment 
throughout the transition period. While strikes and small protests had been happening 
in cities like Tuzla for several years, in February 2014 a demonstration organised by 
unpaid, frustrated workers in front of the Tuzla Canton government building gained 
unprecedented national attention. After police reacted forcefully to the escalation of 
tensions on February 5th, an even greater number of demonstrators went on the streets 
on the following day, and protests started occurring in solidarity with Tuzla in 
Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar, and other towns. On February 7th, the Tuzla Cantonal 
Government resigned, soon to be followed by others.4 The protests, stemming from 
socioeconomic issues characterising post-industrial centres, quickly expanded both in 
terms of issues raised and in the forms of political participation stemming from them.   
The February 2014 protests brought socioeconomic justice to the forefront of 
public debate, something that had been absent since the end of the war. In the words of 
one activist, ‘the combination of notions of “social” and “justice” had been virtually 
unknown among local intellectuals, activists and the social scene’ (Hakalović 2014, 7). 
The protests highlighted the socioeconomic discontent that had been latent for so many 
years during the transition process. In a collection of essays authored by Bosnian 
activists, the spirit of the protests is summed up as ‘an escalation of the social 
discontent of workers, who established themselves as the political subject of the post-
socialist transition, and, also, at the very least, as ordinary people who expected social 
justice’ (Husarić 2014, 67). Workers and citizens in Tuzla, for instance, asked for the 
resolution of all questions related to the privatisation of several local firms, for the 
revision of privatisation agreements, and for the establishment of accountability for 
economic crimes. Demands formulated in Sarajevo, Mostar and Zenica echoed these 
calls. Over the following days, demonstrators in Tuzla and other cities began asking for 
                                                          
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina is institutionally divided in two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The Federation is further composed of ten Cantons, each 
with their own government.  
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the reduction of salaries and compensation for government representatives, and for the 
cessation of all benefits at the end of their time in office.5 Once organised in ‘plenum’ 
assemblies, citizens formulated demands directed towards Cantonal, Entity and BiH 
state governments. An analysis of plenum demands of 22 cities and towns, made in 
early May 2014, shows they mostly targeted the following areas: the privileges of 
political elites, corruption and transparency, social welfare, privatisations (to be 
revised, and those responsible for irregular ones to be prosecuted), and government 
resignations.6 Overall, the demands were concerned with the general socioeconomic 
wellbeing of the Bosnian society, the importance of work, and the accountability of 
political elites responsible for the mismanagement of the country’s resources. Similarly 
to previous civic protests in Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkan region, demands and 
protest slogans were vocal in their criticism of nationalist politics (Keil and Moore 
2014; Štiks 2015). 
In addition to raising socioeconomic justice concerns previously left at the 
margins, the protest movement also witnessed the participation of actors that were not 
traditionally involved in transitional justice and peacebuilding projects.  The events of 
February 2014 highlighted a separation in the Bosnian civil sector, between formalised 
NGOs that developed as part of the liberal peace project with the support of 
international donors (see, e.g., Ghodsee 2004; Belloni 2007; Baker 2014), and the 
common citizens, workers and activists who joined the demonstrations. While 
individual members of NGOs were present among the demonstrators, no specific 
organisation or committee led the movement. Openness and lack of recognised leaders 
was one of the defining features of the protests, and intellectuals stressed they would 
participate in, but not lead, the articulation of demands (Nedimović 2014a; Sicurella 
2016). The primary forum for discussion and participation was therefore the citizens’ 
plenum. Plenum assemblies are defined as ‘public gatherings, open to any citizen, 
                                                          
5 Tuzla Declaration of Citizens and Workers, 7 February 2014, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/07/declaration-of-citizens-and-workers-in-
tuzla-1/ >; Protestor Demands from Sarajevo, 9 February 2014 available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/09/40/>; Zenica Protestors Deliver their 
Demands, 10 February 2014, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/10/zenica-protestors-deliver-their-demands-t
o-cantonal-government-zenica-1/>; Mostar Citizens’ Demands 10 February 2014; available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/10/mostar-citizens-demands-mostar-1/>; all 
accessed 22/04/2016.  
6 Citizen demands, 5th May 2014, Damir Karamehmedovic, available at  
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/05/13/visualizing-the-plenum-demands/>, 
accessed 22/04/2016.  
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through which collective decisions and demands can be made and action taken, 
beyond guarantees of leadership. They are open, direct, and transparent democracy in 
practice’ (Arsenijević 2014b, 47-48). Only members of political parties were, in most 
cases, banned from participating in plenum meetings.7 
While political demands were primarily addressed towards BiH institutions, 
the international community became increasingly involved with the protests and the 
issues raised by the plena (plural of plenum),8 even more so in the aftermath of the 
floods that devastated the country in May 2014. Faced with justice demands of a 
socioeconomic nature, and with a broad-based civic movement, the international 
community promoted discourses on economic reforms that were in line with its own 
agenda, but did not address the demonstrators’ concerns. Such concerns were 
reframed as a problem to be tackled through internationally-sponsored economic 
measures, rather than as justice issues. This reformulation is best understood in 
relation to two elements. Their analysis shows that international reactions to the 
protests effectively reproduced the ‘invisibility’ of socioeconomic problems in 
transitional justice efforts (Miller 2008), and that international engagement with 
Bosnian society is ‘hedged around by other commitments, to certain kinds of market 
arrangements or individual rights’ (Williams and Young 2012).  
The first element in these reactions was the EU-led effort to formulate a 
‘Compact for Growth and Jobs’ as a way of tackling socioeconomic problems.9 
Following the protests and the floods, the EU finally started perceiving socioeconomic 
problems as closer to the concerns of ordinary Bosnian citizens (EU 2014, 2), compared 
                                                          
7 See for instance Announcement: First meeting of the Brčko District Citizens’ Plenum, 11 February 
2014 available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/11/announcement-first-meeting-of-the-citize
ns-plenum-of-brcko-district/>, and Sarajevans invited to first meetings of Citizens’ Plenum, 11 
February 2014, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/11/sarajevans-invited/>. The Tuzla Plenum, 
on the other hand, remained open to participation from everyone: Announcement of the citizens’ 
plenum in Tuzla, 12 February 2014; available at  
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/12/announcement-of-the-citizens-plenum-in-
tuzla/>, all accessed 22/04/2016 
8 Večer: Interview with HR Valentin Inzko, Office of the High Representative, 12 February 2014, 
<http://www.ohr.int/?p=31864&lang=en>; Statement by the Ambassadors of the Steering Board of 
the Peace Implementation Council, 11 February 2014, <http://www.ohr.int/?p=31892&lang=en>; 
both accessed 27/04/2016. 
9 While the EU took the lead in this process, this was the result of the cooperation of those actors 
that usually comprise the ‘international community’ in BiH. As stated in the introduction to the 
Compact for Growth and Jobs, these include the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the United States and other relevant international experts.  
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to the institutional questions upon which Brussels had previously focused. It was 
within this spirit that the EU, in close cooperation with other international 
organisations and financial institutions, organised a two-day event in Sarajevo called 
‘Forum for Prosperity and Jobs’, with the aim of developing a set of key priorities for 
socioeconomic reforms in BiH.10  
The resulting Compact for Growth and Jobs, presented in July 2014, highlighted 
six areas where measures should be taken: taxes on work, to be lowered; barrier to jobs, to 
be addressed through the flexibilisation of the labour market; business climate; 
enterprise, focusing on the completion of the privatisation process; corruption; and social 
protection, to be redirected from privileged categories, including war veterans, to those 
in real need. While such reforms had been deemed necessary for years,11 the February 
protests represented an opportunity for pushing towards their realisation. The 
Compact represented, indeed, a shift in the international – and especially European – 
discourse towards Bosnia, from a phase of ‘political’ to one of ‘economic restructuring’ 
(Majstorović and Vučkovac 2016, forthcoming). Overall, protestors’ requests to 
determine accountability for the mismanagement of public resources, including 
irregular privatisations, were side-lined, and justice issues were only addressed 
through ‘the inclusion of additional rule of law matters, in particular the fight against 
corruption’ within the Structured Dialogue on Justice (EU 2014, 1). Moreover, the issue 
of employment for young people was tied, in international discourse, to the necessity 
of cutting the privileges of public-sector ‘insiders’ with secure jobs, and of the ‘cadre of 
ghost workers who are just clinging on to the past’, for which ‘no contributions are 
made’ but who ‘still hope to receive social benefits’,12 such as former factory workers 
whose concerns were at the heart of the protests. Economic issues were, in other 
words, treated as problems that could only be addressed by dispensing completely 
with socialist legacies, in line with international attitudes that had marginalised the 
socialist experience in shaping Bosnia’s transition (Gilbert 2006).  
By promoting the Forum and Compact, as well as through other initiatives, the 
international community also legitimated certain forms of action and participation over 
others, and established specific fora within which debates on socioeconomic problems 
                                                          
10 EU Delegation to BiH, Forum for Prosperity and Jobs starts in Sarajevo, 26 May 2014, 
<http://europa.ba/?p=18008> , accessed 25/05/2015. 
11 Interview with international official, Sarajevo, May 2015.   
12 EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Compact for Growth and Jobs, 
<http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/delegacijaEU_2014090816171626eng.pdf>  
accessed 10/09/2015. 
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could be conducted. Activists and international officials agreed that the grassroots 
character of the movement conferred it a greater degree of legitimacy in the eyes of 
Bosnian citizens. They were perceived, however, as lacking the capabilities and skills 
that the NGO sector had developed though years of international training and project 
work.13 Due to this, and to the absence of leaders or hierarchies within the movement, 
international organisations turned towards those they could ‘recognise’ and speak to, 
such as individuals with a good knowledge of English.14 According to the then EU 
Special Representative in BiH Sorensen, the May 2014 Forum for Prosperity and Jobs 
had supposedly been a means for the international community to ‘provide a platform 
for all the citizens of this country to (…) initiate a socio-economic reform process’.15 
Interviewees raised doubts, however, as to whether activists from the Plenum were 
actually present at the Forum meetings, and whether those who were there represented 
the spirit of the protests or rather ‘a part of the civil sector that was chosen’ by the 
international community.16 A similar approach was taken by the EU in organising the 
series of ‘Conversations with the citizens’ (Razgovori s građanima) in the spring and 
summer of 2015, intended to ‘promote public debate on socio-economic reforms’ and 
discuss ‘with local people (…) a common agenda of economic opportunity for all’.17 
Again, one activist pointed out that the actual intent behind the Conversations was 
explaining the Compact to the citizens and convincing them of its usefulness rather 
than engaging in a real discussion about the reforms to be undertaken in order to 
stimulate growth and employment.18 If one response to the critique of liberal 
peacebuilding as a top-down endeavour had been the promotion of ‘local ownership’ 
(Donais 2009), the international engagement on the Compact for Growth bears a 
greater resemblance to techniques of government aimed at establishing discursive 
boundaries and meanings, influencing individual preferences and behaviour 
                                                          
13 Interview with international official, Sarajevo, 30 April 2015; interview with Meliha 
Bajramović (Plenum Zenica), 30 July 2015.  
14 Interview with anonymous activist, Sarajevo, 17 June 2014.  
15 EU Delegation to BiH, Opening remarks by the Ambassador Sorensen at the Forum for Prosperity 
and Jobs in Bosnia and Herzegovina <http://europa.ba/?post_type=post&p=18002>, accessed 25 
May 2015. 
16 Interview with anonymous activist, Sarajevo 5 May 2015; see also the interview with the 
Dutch Ambassador to BiH Jurriaan Kraak conducted by Nidžara Ahmetašević, 
<http://bosniaherzegovina.nlembassy.org/news/2014/august/interview-with-ambassador-
kraak.html> , accessed 29 August 2015.  
17 EU Delegation to BiH, New initiative of the EUSR Office in BiH helps stakeholders explore practical 
reforms to create jobs, <http://europa.ba/?p=16883>,  accessed 25 May 2015 
18 Šta znači Sporazum za Rast i Zaposljavanje? Razgovor s građanima, Istočno Sarajevo, 28 May 2015. 
The author was present at the event.  
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(Lazzarato 2009). The discussion of economic problems raised by the protests was thus 
effectively limited to the agenda set by the EU meetings, falling short of addressing 
them through a socioeconomic justice lens.  
Even when looking beyond the Compact for Growth, the international 
approach to engaging with grassroots groups active in the protests seems geared 
towards selecting specific interlocutors and issues to be discussed. The protests, as 
highlighted above, not only raised issues that were foreign to the peacebuilding 
framework in BiH, but did so through forms of social mobilisation that did not fit 
within that paradigm. International engagement, therefore, also attempted to make 
them understandable and recognisable (see Autesserre 2014). In September 2014, the 
EU contributed to organising a meeting in Vienna, with the aim of providing a 
‘platform for exchange to the citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to formulate 
common demands for a better future based on democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights’.19 Participants were selected through an application process, and discussions at 
the conference conducted in working groups around themes that left out some of the 
most radical socioeconomic justice demands raised during the protests.20 The 
Conclusions put forth by the conference did mention the difficult economic situation 
and socioeconomic rights, but displayed a visible shift in the language they used, or 
rather an attempt to mediate between the protesters’ demands and the international 
community’s language. For instance, in calling for the ‘respect of human rights, 
workers’ rights, socio-economic rights’, the final recommendations go beyond the 
liberal focus on civil and political rights. To some extent, this is indicative of an 
increased acceptance of socioeconomic issues as part of the political debate in 
peacebuilding contexts. However, justice issues were still tightly linked to the ‘reform 
of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies’ and the fight against organised crime,21 
excluding demands related to failed privatisation processes and economic crimes that 
had sparked the protests in the first place. Socioeconomic justice, therefore, still 
remains foreign to the transitional justice-peacebuilding nexus, and in contrast with the 
                                                          
19 Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, Main Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Conference “Civil Society as a Factor of Change in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Vienna, 8-10 September 
2014, accessed 25/05/2015. 
<http://bim.lbg.ac.at/sites/files/bim/attachments/main_conclusions_and_recommendations
_0.pdf>. 
20 Interview with anonymous activist, Sarajevo 2 June 2015.  
21 Ibid.  
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direction taken by the economic reforms promoted by the international community 
(Miller 2008; Laplante 2014).  
The overall success of the meeting was also compromised by mistrust among 
different groups,22 and by diffidence towards an externally-driven process.23. Partly as 
a result of this, some of the working groups failed to put forth recommendations and 
only presented a summary of the ‘main discussions, opinions and questions’.24 At the 
same time, activists recognise that such meetings allowed grassroots groups from 
different parts of the country to meet for the first time, and laid the basis for a 
subsequent project aimed at supporting eight grassroots groups in BiH, implemented 
by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute.25 Similarly to what has been observed in other 
contexts, while allowing for the expression of local agency, the international 
community still kept control of mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (see Donais 
2009), and defined the agenda and modes of debate in a way that was intelligible and 
compatible with its policy goals. 
Overall, the events following the February 2014 protests show how 
socioeconomic justice issues could not be understood by the international community 
within the transitional justice or peacebuilding framework. These were, rather, 
reframed as a call for social and economic reform compatible with the international 
agenda. While the international intervention had long promoted discourses of justice 
as accountability for war crimes and genocide, socioeconomic issues had so far 
remained marginal. When they did effectively come to the forefront through the 
protests, the international community provided a framework for understanding and 
debating them as problems to be addressed in ways compatible with Bosnia’s ongoing 
transition towards liberal democracy and market economy, rather than as justice 
issues. The eruption of popular discontent in 2014 thus shows that social mobilisation 
                                                          
22 Interview with anonymous activist, Sarajevo, 5 May 2015. 
23 Interviews with Jasmina Čolić (activist, Jer me se tiče); interview with anonymous activist, 
Sarajevo, 2 June 2015. 
24Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, Summary of the Working Group discussions during 
the Conference “Civil Society as a Factor for Change in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, September 2014, 
accessed 25/05/2015. 
<http://bim.lbg.ac.at/sites/files/bim/attachments/working_groups_summary_0.pdf>. 
25 The so-called ‘Austrian Initiative’ developed in the aftermath of the Vienna Conference, 
without the support of the European Union Delegation. The initiative works with some of the 
grassroots groups that emerged during the protests, both in the Federation of BiH and in 
Republika Srpska, offering support to informal groups rather without specific funding 
conditions. (Supporting informal citizens’ groups and grass-root initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
2015, Interim Report, Nina Radović, Ludwig Boltzman Institute of Human Rights – Research 
Association, February 2016).   
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not only provides an avenue for voicing justice concerns that had been previously 
marginalised, but also represents a terrain where – even after an eruption of discontent 
– different approaches to justice issues and to socioeconomic reform will continue to be 
contested and negotiated between international organisations and local grassroots 
groups.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The international intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina encompassed a wide range 
of activities and responsibilities including peacebuilding and transitional justice. While 
the initial commitment to transitional justice efforts can be seen as a balancing act for 
the unwillingness to intervene and stop the violence during the conflict (Gow 1997), it 
later became accepted that addressing injustice was an important component of the 
peacebuilding agenda (UN 1995). However, the liberal bias embedded within the 
transitional justice framework, privileging individual forms of accountability for 
serious violations of basic human rights, left socioeconomic issues affecting the Bosnian 
society substantially unaddressed. This bias is not entirely disconnected from the 
production of knowledge about the Bosnian war, where the focus has intensively been 
placed on interethnic violence and responsibility for war crimes, while socioeconomic 
problems related to the overlapping challenges of post-war and post-socialist transition 
have remained substantially less researched (with some notable exceptions, including 
Jansen 2006; Baker 2012). Within such contexts, collective demands related to workers’ 
rights, welfare, and economic crimes could not be interpreted as justice demands. As 
this paper has shown, even when faced with social mobilisation for socioeconomic 
justice issues, the international community could not address them within the 
transitional justice framework.  
While debates on the relevance of socioeconomic justice for transitional justice 
and peacebuilding have greatly developed in recent years, practices have struggled to 
change and adapt to the need to give relevance to such concerns. This paper has sought 
to account for this inertia in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Evidence from Bosnia 
suggests that that the issue of transitional justice and peacebuilding practice failing to 
account for socioeconomic justice is particularly problematic in complex transitional 
contexts – and especially those undergoing a double transition from war to peace and 
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from socialism to a market economy. In such contexts, analysing transformations from 
an institutional perspective is not sufficient. This paper has suggested that the 
transitional justice literature could benefit from a deeper engagement with the critical 
peacebuilding scholarship, more attentive to the social implications of international 
interventions, and to the power relations, negotiations and contestations at play in 
these settings. Transitional justice scholars should therefore feel compelled to take into 
account the exclusionary and silencing effects of common approaches to dealing with 
the past, and interrogate themselves on whether, and how, we can actually ‘move 
beyond liberal notions of justice and past-reckoning’ (Nedimović 2014b, 5). Indeed, the 
2014 Bosnian protests highlight how the international community’s intervention at the 
societal level limited the scope of justice claims and the forms of political participation 
recognised. The analysis presented in this paper warrants an exploration of societal 
reactions, and more generally emphasises the need to take into account the relational 
and ‘messy’ character of power relations in the context of international intervention.  
This paper offers a twofold contribution to understanding the transitional 
justice-peacebuilding nexus. Firstly, this nexus is itself shown to be embedded within a 
broader neoliberal transformation, characterising the international intervention in BiH 
but also in other sites. The links created between transitional justice and peacebuilding 
as part of this international intervention, and the operation of both fields of practice 
within the framework of post-socialist neoliberal economic reforms, greatly contribute 
to the marginalisation of socioeconomic justice. While in the case of Bosnia such forces 
are at play within the context of the post-socialist transition, economic restructuring 
along neoliberal lines has also characterised other contexts beyond the post-socialist 
space (Barchiesi 2011). Secondly, the paper also demonstrates that looking beyond the 
institutional aspect of post-war transformations is necessary in order to see how the 
transitional justice-peacebuilding nexus ought to be situated in the lived experiences of 
affected societies, such as socioeconomic injustice affecting post-industrial areas (and 
Bosnia as a post-industrial country). In the specific case of BiH, this led to the 
expression of discontent through protests in 2014. The protests were informed by the 
specific political conditions of Bosnia’s post-war and post-socialist transition, but also 
resemble struggles for social justice of other contemporary movements against 
neoliberalism, characterised by horizontal participation and social justice claims 
(Castells 2015). Expressions of popular discontent are, in the end, illustrative of the 
contestations and struggles that surround the practices of international interventions at 
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the local level, and cannot be isolated from the political and economic priorities 
informing those interventions. Examining why interventions may nevertheless fail to 
understand and recognise claims for socioeconomic justice may reveal much about 
how such political and economic priorities are formed.  
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